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WITNESSES- IMPRISONMENT OF THE
MATERIAL WITNESS FOR FAILURE
TO GIVE BOND*
I. INTRODUCTION
A defendant charged with highway robbery was released on
bail in the usual manner pending trial. At the trial, six months
later, it appeared that the complaining witness had throughout this
period been incarcerated for his inability to post bond.' A second
case involved a seven dollar robbery. The victim, who reported the
robbery, was rewarded for his trouble by imprisonment for a con-
siderable time because he lacked the money to procure a bond.
2
Such cases, unfortunately, while perhaps not usual, can hardly be
regarded as atypical. The purpose here is to consider selected major
problems in the law concerning imprisonment of material witnesses
in criminal actions for failure to give recognizance as required. The
state of the present law is considered, relevant constitutional prob-
lems are noted, and an effort is made in conclusion to consider the
wisdom and desirability of present practices in the light of contem-
porary social conditions.
II. SURVEY OF PRESENT LAW
A. GKNERAL
Most states by statute permit or require state witnesses in crimi-
nal cases to be imprisoned for failure to give recognizance as re-
quired.3 Some, as in the case of the Federal and New York statutes,
draw no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, while
Other closely related comments are: 7 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 37 (1959);
5 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213 (1954); 18 MO. L. REV. 38 (1953). See also
Bernstein, The Crime of Being a Witness, 3 J. MO. B. 223 (N.S. 1947);
Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1955).
'Bernstein, The Crime of Being a Witness, 3 J. MO. B. 223 (1947).
2 In re Petrie, 1 Kan. App. 184, 40 Pac. 118 (1895).
3 At least three states do not have statutes authorizing imprisonment of
witnesses for failure to post bond: Arkansas, Indiana, and Kentucky. The
statutes of the states authorizing imprisonment of material witnesses are
collected in 7 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 37, 38, n. 7 (1958).
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others, such as Nebraska, are limited only to felonies. Still others
apply only to the most serious felonies. 4 Data relating to frequency
of use of such statutes is spotty. Generally, available evidence indi-
cates that they are seldom employed in misdemeanor cases but that
the frequency of their use in felony cases varies markedly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In New York, however, where most of
the material witness litigation has arisen, prosecutors insist that
they are seldom employed. Statistics supplied to the author by
the District Attorney of Kings County, New York, for example, indi-
cate that only seventeen persons were committed as material wit-
nesses out of a total of 11,420 misdemeanor cases and 4,000 felony
cases.5
One further preliminary point: There is a fundamental diffi-
culty in stating even the broad outlines of the law governing com-
mitment of material witnesses. Cases are few and far between and
the decisions are scattered over nearly 100 years. Doubtless many
of the old cases are of questionable value as precedent today.
Furthermore, much of the case law deals with interpretation of
statutes which by now have been amended in material respects.
Indeed, the law of material witnesses, so far as their commitment
for failure to recognize is concerned, is entirely the creature of
statutes. At common law a magistrate had no authority to imprison
a witness for failure to recognize.6 However, it should be noted that
4 E.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618(b) (1957); FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b)
(no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
29-507 and 29-508 (Reissue 1956) (applicable only in felonies); FLA.
STAT. §§ 902.15 to .17 (1941) (applicable only in murder, rape, robbery,
arson, or kidnapping). As to Nebraska law-there are no reported cases
or attorney general opinions relating to these sections. Data is generally
unavailable as to the frequency of application of the statute by the various
county prosecutors. The following statement, however, was received from
the Douglas County Attorney's office: "Generally speaking, this office has
had little or no need to request recognizance for a material witness in a
criminal prosecution. The few times that such a procedure has been used,
it has been on an informal basis wherein the witness was booked at the
police station in the absence of a magistrate, and the notation was merely
made that he was released on his own recognizance." Letter from John
E. Clark, Deputy County Attorney, Douglas County, Nebraska, January
14, 1960, on file with the Nebraska Law Review.
5 Letter from Edward S. Silver, District Attorney of Kings County, New
York, January 11, 1960, on file with the Nebraska Law Review. In New
York County, the statute has been used during the past three years as
follows: "1957, 36 times; 1958, 39 times; 1959, 53 times." Letter from Allan
A. Pines, Assistant District Attorney, New York County, February 9, 1960,
on file with the Nebraska Law Review.
6 Ex parte Riddle, 25 Okla. Crim. 25, 218 Pac. 894 (1923); In re Singer,
134 Cal. App. 2d 547, 285 P.2d 955 (1955); Little v. Territory, 28 Okla. 467,
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the United States Supreme Court held on one occasion that the
United States Senate had the right to confine a witness in jail while
waiting to testify.7 Momentarily putting to one side relevant con-
stitutional questions, let us turn to certain basic questions in the
law concerning material witnesses.
B. WHO ARE MATERIAL WITNESSES AND WHEN DO THEY BECOME SUCH
To become a material or necessary witness within the typical
statute it must appear that the person has knowledge of facts closely
connected to the crime," or to the accused, 9 in a criminal action.
A criminal action has been interpreted to include grand jury in-
vestigations, 0 where a warrant has been issued for the accused,"
and even district attorney investigations, though as to the latter
there has been vigorous dissent. 2 And, as previously mentioned,
some statutes only apply when the defendant is in custody 13 and
to particular types of crimes, viz., felonies or serious felonies.
C. RIGHT TO HEARING
The early cases upheld material witness statutes providing for
imprisonment of the witness even though no hearing was provided.14
Currently some of the statutes require a hearing before a court of
record to determine whether the witness is necessary and material,
and an opportunity to be heard in opposition is provided. 15 Even
114 Pac. 699 (1911); Ljubisich v. Brown, 276 Ill. 186, 114 N.E. 583 (1916).
Only one case has been found contra, Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. 463, 69 S.E.
582 (1910). For history and development of the witness' duty to testify
see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2190 (1940).
7 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
8 Ex parte Grzyeskowiak, 267 Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934) (present at
time of crime).
9 Ex parte Rankin, 330 Mich. 94, 47 N.W.2d 29 (1951) (had given alibi for
accused at time of crime).
10 E.g., O'Connell v. McElhiney, 138 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1954). There are
many New York cases where witnesses were held in jail for grand jury
investigations.
11 See Ex parte Grzyeskowiak, 267 Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934) (dictum).
"2See dissent in People v. Doe, 26 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1941).
13 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 902.15 (1941), "If defendant is held on charge ... "
14E.g., In re Petrie, 1 Kan. App. 184, 40 Pac. 118 (1895).
15E.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618(b) (1957).
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though the statute does not provide for a hearing, it has recently
been held that a satisfactory hearing must be provided before a
court of record to determine materiality. 16 Due process today
should require at least this.
D. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The statutes are silent as to any right to counsel. From the
cases it appears that at times a lawyer representing the witness was
present; at other times he has had no counsel.17 It has been held
that the witness was not deprived of his right where he did not re-
quest counsel, but where counsel was requested and refused that
the witness was so deprived. 8
E. EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO COMMIT
Various factors are important in considering imprisonment or
the amount of the bond. They are the seriousness of the crime, the
character of the witness, the importance of his testimony, the rela-
tionship of the witness to the accused, the need for physical protec-
tion of the witness, the possibility of fleeing the jurisdiction,19 and
whether the witness has been difficult to locate or has given con-
flicting statements to police.20 Whether the witness has an estab-
lished residence in the state or is currently unemployed would like-
wise be considered. 21 Any one or more of the above factors may
justify commitment of the witness for failure to post bond.
16 Quince v. Langlois, - R.I __, 149 A.2d 349 (1959).
71d., (no lawyer present); Ex parte Rankin, 330 Mich. 94, 47 N.W.2d 29
(1951) (witness had a lawyer at hearing).
18 People ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
19 People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E.2d 170 (1947); Cf.,
People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 302 N.Y. 173, 96
N.E.2d 763 (1951).
20 United States v. Von Bonim, 24 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); People
ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (conflicting state-
ments); Ex parte Grzyeskowiak, 267 Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934)
(difficult to locate); Ex parte Rankin, 330 Mich. 94, 47 N.W.2d 29 (1951)
(conflicting statements and difficult to locate).
21State v. Kemp, 124 La. 85, 49 So. 987 (1909) (non-resident); Ex parte
Prall, 89 Okla. Crim. 413, 208 P.2d 960 (1949) (transient minor with no
job or home in the state); Ex parte Sheppard, 43 Tex. Crim. 372, 66 S.W.
304 (1902) (reason to believe witness about to move from county); People
COMMENTS
The prosecutor alleges on oath, usually by affidavit, facts and
reasons why the recognizance or bond is required. Usually it must
be alleged that the witness is material and will be unavailable at the
time required. However, this varies somewhat with the particular
statute. The New York statute, for example, requires an allegation
that the witness is necessary as well as material. The statutes typi-
cally do not require allegations that the witness is evading or intend-
ing to evade judicial process. The prosecutor's affidavit is taken as
prima facie proof2 2 but the magistrate must make some inquiry of
the witness to determine materiality.23 If the witness challenges
the prosecutor's allegations, it becomes a question of fact for the
judge to determine whether the allegations as to materiality are
true,24 and where the statute requires, to find whether there is rea-
sonable ground to believe that the witness will not appear at the
trial. Very few cases have been found where the witness was sub-
sequently released because of insufficient evidence after the ques-
tions of the amount of the bond or necessity of retaining the witness
have once been determined by the magistrate. More often, the
witness is released or the bond reduced for other reasons.
F. IMPRISONMENT DISTINCTIONS
Usually the statutes do not provide whether the witness is en-
titled to fees while he is imprisoned. Where this is not made clear by
statute, the question is whether the witness has been in attendance
at court. The cases are divided.25 Likewise, most statutes are silent
as to a maximum time limit for imprisonment. Where the statutes
provide no limit the courts have only allowed imprisonment for "a
reasonable time." Courts* have held four months to be both reason-
able and unreasonable.26 In a few cases witnesses have been held for
as long as six to eight months.2 7 The cases show that a person has
ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 12 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (reason to believe witness would leave state or conceal himself).
22See People ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
23 Quince v. Langlois, - R.I. ___ 149 A.2d 349 (1959).
24 See generally Ex parte Sheppard, 43 Tex. Crim. 372, 66 S.W. 304 (1902).
25 See Note, 5 UTAH L. REV. 119 (1956). The cases are collected in Annot.,
50 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1955).
26People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 302 N.Y. 173, 96
N.E.2d 763 (1951) (four months reasonable); Ex parte Grzyeskowiak,
267 Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934) (four months unreasonable).
27 Barber v. Moss, 3 Utah 2d 268, 282 P.2d 838 (1955) (six months); People
ex rel. Troy v. Pettit, 44 N.Y. Supp. 256 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (148 days); Hall
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been held as a witness even though he was suspected or charged
with a crime, and later proceeded against as a defendant. 28 A con-
fession extracted from a person jailed as a witness has later been
used, over strong dissent, to gain a conviction against him. 29
G. APPEAL AND HABEAS CORPUS
The statutes are silent as to another important° question-
whether the witness has any right of appeal after the magistrate
has set the amount of the bond. In the only case found where this
was directly in question the court held, in the absence of statute,
that the witness had no right of appeal.30 Of course, once the witness
is deprived of his liberty-imprisoned in default of the bond-habeas
corpus and certiorari become available.3 1 However, the issues ex-
amined in habeas corpus are limited and there is a presumption of
regularity. Nevertheless, the court has jurisdiction in a habeas
corpus action to review the reasonableness of the bond and the
period of incarceration as well as the sufficiency of the evidence on
the issues of materiality and probable non-availability.
8 2
v. Commissioners of Somerset County, 82 Md. 618, 34 Atl. 771 (1896) (242
days).
2 8 0'Connell v. McElhiney, 138 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1954); People ex tel.
Goodrich v. Warden of Civil City Prison, 137 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 302 N.Y. 173, 96
N.E.2d 763 (1951). But cf. In re Presligiacomo, 255 N.Y. Supp. 289 (App.
Div. 1932); In re Mayers, 169 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Co. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1957).
29People v. Perez, 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E.2d 40 (1949).
30People v. Doe, 26 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1941). The reasons given for
denial of appeal were that it was not a criminal action, the statute did
not provide for appeal, that appeal would be inadequate because of the
time factor, and that habeas corpus was more effective. The dissenting
judge pointed out the fact that because habeas corpus was available was
no reason to deny appeal, that the witness must be imprisoned before
habeas corpus becomes available, and that habeas corpus was inadequate
as to the issues of materiality and availability of the witness.
31 State v. McGouldrick, 169 La. 187, 124 So. 823 (1929).
32 People ex rel. Weiner v. Collins, 22 N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Div. 1940) (juris-
diction to review reasonableness of bond); Ex parte Grzyeskowiak, 267
Mich. 697, 255 N.W. 359 (1934) (reasonableness of time); Quince v.
Langlois, - R.I. -, 149 A.2d 349 (1959) (materiality); People ex rel.
Richards v. Warden of City Prison, 98 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1950)
(availability). A false imprisonment action has also been allowed where
the witness was detained without authority in Gise v. Brooklyn Society
for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 259 N.Y. Supp. 562 (App. Div.
1932), modified 260 N.Y. Supp. 787 (App. Div. 1932); cf. Bates v. Kitchel,




Witnesses jailed for failure or inability to post bond often allege
that their constitutional rights have been violated-usually that
they have been deprived of liberty without due process or denied
equal protection of the law. As yet courts have seldom held the
statutes unconstitutional on their face even though no hearing,
lawyer, or maximum imprisonment is provided for.33
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
The legislature may set up classifications and a statute will not
be held unconstitutional just because it is harsh or unwise if it does
not unreasonably invade private rights. However, assuming the
classification is reasonable, the law must apply equally to those
within the classifications. 34 There is an expanding doctrine in the
judicial system that a poor person may not be discriminated against;
and the United States Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Illinois that
it is a violation of equal protection to deny a person a statutory right
of appeal only because he was too poor to pay for printing of the
transcript.3 5
It is obvious from a reading of the statutes and case law that
material witnesses are not treated equally. First of all, many wit-
nesses go free merely on their own personal recognizance. Secondly,
some witnesses are required to supply personal appearance bonds
which are requested by the prosecutor and set at the discretion of
the magistrate. And thirdly, some witnesses who are unable to post
bonds because of their poverty are jailed for relatively long periods
until the state is ready to use their testimony. Furthermore, wit-
33 0nly one case has been found directly holding one of these statutes un-
constitutional. People ex rel. Maloney v. Sheriff of Kings County, 192
N.Y. Supp. 553 (Sup. Ct. 1921), and it has not been followed. See People
ex rel. Brano v. Maudlin, 123 Misc. 906, 206 N.Y. Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
The United States Supreme Court in Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929), referring to the federal witness statute,
stated: "The constitutionality of this statute apparently has never been
doubted. Similar statutes exist in many of the states and have been en-
forced without question." Id. at 617.
34 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
35 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 958 (1956) ; See also Marx & Haas Jean Clothing
Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S.W. 391, 395 (1902).
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nesses are jailed indiscriminately, generally without distinctions of
extenuating circumstances being observed. For example, one wit-
ness is jailed, and probably rightly so, because he intentionally re-
fuses to give his personal recognizance submitting to the jurisdiction
of the court. Another witness, although he willingly gives his per-
sonal recognizance, is jailed because he intentionally refuses to
supply the money to furnish the required bond. And another witness
is likewise jailed although he is willing to personally recognize, and
even though he has failed to post bond only because of his poverty.
C. DUE PROCESS
Where a state deprives a person of his liberty it must be done via
due process of law. And where adversary proceedings are concerned
it is well settled that two essential elements of due process are notice
and the right to be heard in opposition; this is true whether or not
the statute provides for such.36 The right to a hearing may be
waived 37 and the hearing need not be before a judgment if an appeal
is afforded.38 In the case of the witness it has been held there is no
right of appeal.3 9 Thus there must be an adequate hearing before
the witness is committed if due process is to be observed.
Another question is whether the witness has the right to counsel
and if so whether he must be advised of this right. Probably the
most closely analogous situation here is the right of an accused to
counsel in a preliminary hearing. Although the witness is not ac-
cused of a crime, the same results flow to him as to the defendant in
the preliminary hearing, i.e., bail or incarceration until trial. An ac-
cused may not be refused counsel in the preliminary hearing, but the
states are split as to whether he must be advised of his right or fur-
nished a lawyer at that stage.40 The majority of the states advise
the defendant of his right to counsel at all stages. In failing to ad-
vise of the right to counsel at the preliminary stage the minority
38 A large number of cases are collected in 12 AM. JUR. Constitutional Law
§ 573 nn. 16, 17 (1938).
37 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
3 8 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
39People v. Doe, 26 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1941). See Ohio ex rel. Bryant
v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930), to the effect that the right
of appeal is not essential for due process if observed in original proceed-
ings. But cf. Findlay v. Board of Sup'rs. of County of Mohave, 72 Ariz.
58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951), where no due process in the original proceedings.
40 The cases are collected in Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949).
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reason that it is not yet a criminal proceeding.41 Similar reasoning
was applied in the only case directly deciding this question in the
case of the material witness. In People v. Ryan,42 two witnesses
were held in jail on default of bond. One asked for his lawyer-and
was refused. He was released because of denial of counsel. The
other witness did not request counsel, and it was held that as to him
there was no denial of counsel although he had not been advised of
his right. The witness, like the defendant, should be advised of his
right to counsel at the hearing because incarceration for several
months sometimes follows. Also, the statutes require that some sort
of criminal proceedings must be in progress before the witnesses are
recognized. If the proceedings have progressed sufficiently to re-
quire recognizance, bonding, and jailing of witnesses, it should be
sufficient to require that they be advised of their right to counsel.
The next question would then be whether the state would constitu-
tionally be required to furnish an indigent witness with counsel. It is
submitted that the answer should be in the affirmative.
D. EXCESSIVE FINES AND BAIL
The cases are divided as to whether constitutional prohibitions
of excessive bail and fines are applicable to witnesses. Some courts
have said the section is inapplicable because the witness is not ac-
cused of a crime.43 However, assuming that the Eighth Amendment
restricts state action or that the state has a comparable provision,
it seems that excessive bail or fines would be prohibited in the
case of the witness since the provision is not limited in terms to
criminal prosecutions or to one accused of a crime. Particularly high
bonds have been held to be excessive, and it has been argued that
bonds set at a very high figure are, in effect, an exclusion of bail.4 4
Seldom, however, have bonds been found to be excessive on appeal.
4 1 E.g., Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 17 N.W.2d 666 (1945); Lingo v. Hann,
161 Neb. 67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955).
42 In People ex rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1953), the court
held the witness had not been denied counsel in absence of such request
but the court said the witness should be advised of right to counsel. The
present New York custom is that the magistrate advises the witness of
his right to counsel, and if the witness cannot afford counsel the court
assigns a lawyer to act without fee.
43People ex tel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E.2d 170 (1947); State v.
McGouldrick, 169 La. 187, 124 So. 823 (1929) (dictum).
44 People ex rel. Richards v. Warden of City Prison, 98 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App.
Div. 1950). Even if the cost of the bond can be paid the effect may be to
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IV. WISDOM OF THE PRESENT LAW
Assuming the constitutionality of the statutes in terms and ap-
plication, their social desirability and necessity is questionable. A
distinction should first be drawn between the situation where the
witness intentionally refuses to submit to the court's jurisdiction or
is trying to evade service. Incarceration in that event may be desir-
able. Whether it is necessary for the state to require bail of an inno-
cent witness "guilty" only of having knowledge of facts under
inquiry, however, is a different matter. Even more questionable is
the jailing of a witness unable to post bond because he is too poor.
The deprivation of the liberty of the individual wftness must be
weighed against the overall social justice to be gained. On one side,
the prosecutor must have evidence if a conviction is to be gained,
and the accused must be confronted by the witness if the conviction
is to be upheld.45 On the other side, the statutes are very harsh in
method. The only reason for imprisonment of the witness is either
that he is too poor to provide the bond, or it is suspected that he will
not appear as ordered.
Courts have sought to justify commitment of material witnesses
on several different grounds. In People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of
Kings County,46 for example, the court observed that the statute is
"an effective instrument by which law enforcement agencies en-
deavor to cope with offenders against the penal law . . . ." Surely,
holding the witness in jail until needed may be an effective method,
but effectiveness alone cannot justify the undesirable method by
which that end is attained.
impose a stiff penalty for having knowledge of facts under inquiry. Ac-
cording to the current standard cost of appearance bonds, it costs $20
per thousand with security, or $40 per thousand without security. Thus,
it would cost $40 for a $1,000 bond without security. Even with security
it would cost $200 for a $10,000 appearance bond.
45 Imprisonment provisions of these witness statutes have been justified in
terms of necessity. See Comfort v. Kittle, 81 Iowa 179, 46 N.W. 988 (1890).
One prosecutor is of the following opinion: "The prosecutor will favor this
type of statute, knowing full well that innocent people are to be deprived
of their liberty. Such deprivation, however, flows naturally from the
efforts of maintaining an organized and civilized society. The forces of
evil will not hesitate to tamper with a witness, and sometimes the forces
of fear are more potent. The prosecutor must preserve his evidence. If
to do this an innocent person is to be jailed, it is the sacrifice he must
make as his contribution to law and order." Letter from Edward S. Silver,
supra note 5.
4612 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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For three centuries it has been recognized that a witness has a
duty to come forward and give evidence 47 and a few courts have
sought to use this duty as justification for jailing a material witness
too poor to afford a bond. For example, in Markwell v. Warren
County,48 the court reasoned that because of this duty and doubt
that it would be performed, imprisonment of the witness was not
for his poverty but because he could not be trusted to perform his
duty without compulsion. It should be made clear, however, that
the duty owed is for the witness to come before the court and give
evidence when it is required. In the above case the witness was not
imprisoned for a violation of any legal duty. He was not even given
an opportunity to perform or violate the duty which the law
requires. The witness was jailed only on the suspicion that he would
not perform when required. We might compare the divorced hus-
band who is ordered to pay alimony. He may certainly be jailed for
failing to perform that duty, but jailing him on the suspicion that he
will default sometime in the future would be repugnant to our sense
of justice.
Some courts have analogized the position of the witness to that
of the juror. This was done, for example, in both the Ditchik and
Crosby cases. Thus in the former case the court stated: 49 "That it
[imprisonment of the material witness] is a restraint and interfer-
ence upon liberty must be conceded; but so is serving on a jury
which is locked up night after night and week after week for the
duration of a long trial." It is submitted that this analogy is faulty.
Although the witness and the juror have similar duties, viz., to ap-
pear at the trial, and although both may be punished for a violation
of that duty, it would be surprising to find a juror imprisoned be-
cause there was reason to suspect that he would not appear when
required. Yet this is exactly what is done with the witness. Although
the juror can be replaced and the witness cannot, it is certainly
unfair to imprison the witness on the suspicion that he will not do
something which is to be required of him in the future.
A closer analogy has been drawn by the Utah court in Barber v.
Moss,50 which was an action for witness fees. The court compared
the witness to the accused who is kept in jail before the trial, but is
later proven innocent. Although it may be undesirable to keep the
47 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (1940).
4853 Iowa 442, 5 N.W. 570 (1880).
49 People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 12 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344
(Sup. Ct. 1939); cf. Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. 463, 69 S.E. 582 (1910).
503 Utah 2d 268, 282 P.2d 838 (1955).
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accused imprisoned in default of bond, there is evidence that he has
previously committed a crime. Furthermore, the person accused of
a crime has the right to a speedy trial, and other constitutional safe-
guards not available to the witness.
Courts generally have reasoned that if the witness without
funds was exempt from imprisonment until trial there would be
nothing to insure his attendance when required.5 1 Certainly, this is
a problem deserving attention. 52 It was more troublesome, however,
before the widespread enactment of the reciprocal witness statutes,53
and of the Federal statute making it a crime to travel in interstate
commerce to avoid giving testimony.54 To be sure, however, there is
still the problem of locating the witness who absconds and doubt-
less there always will be. But a proper use of the above statutes in
combination with other needed statutes enacting severe penal sanc-
tions for violation of the witness' duty to testify would appear to
be a more satisfactory answer than preventing a violation of that
duty by jailing the witness beforehand.
In 1912 the Committee on Jurisprudence of the American Bar
Association was asked to study and disapprove of material witness
statutes. The committe, however, refused to do so: 55
... It matters not how atrocious the crime, and that the witness to
be detained is the only witness, and that he has expressly declared
that he will flee the country, so as to avoid testifying, yet, never-
theless, we are asked to say that he should not be detained. This
your committee must decline to do, for, while personal liberty is
a sacred right and should not be restrained except by due course
of law, yet we are of opinion that sometimes the purposes of jus-
tice require the involuntary detention of a witness.
In 1930, however, the American Bar Association sponsored
51 E.g., Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. 463, 69 S.E. 582 (1910); Comfort v. Kittle, 81
Iowa 179, 46 N.W. 988 (1890) (dissent). See also Note, 43 HARV. L. REV.
121 (1930).
52 Compare People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 302 N.Y.
173, 96 N.E.2d 763 (1951), with People v. Manufacturer's Cas. Ins. Co.,
109 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1951). These cases show an example of the
prosecutor's problem. Gross was held as a witness in jail for four months
in default of $250,000 bond. Later, the bond was reduced to $25,000 and
he was released to the custody of the district attorney. After his release,
he fled to another state even though he had previously submitted to thejurisdiction of the court.
53 Constitutionality upheld in People v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
54 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1958).
55377 A.B.A. REP. 431-33 (1912).
COMMENTS
Model Code of Criminal Procedure 56 drew an important distinction
between the material witness unable to post bond for financial rea-
sons and one who, though able to do so, was merely obstinate. In
the former case the witness could only be detained for a maximum
of three days or until his deposition was taken, whichever period
was shorter. This would appear to be a reasonable compromise be-
tween the respective interests of the State and of the material
witness.
It is not necessary, constitutionally speaking, for the witness ac-
tually to be present at the trial. The accused's constitutional right of
confrontation is satisfied provided that the accused has at some
point in the criminal proceedings been confronted by the witness
and been afforded the right of cross-examination. 57 There was, to be
sure, much doubt of this in earlier times and state legislatures, be-
cause of such doubt, generally did not provide for the introduction
of depositions on behalf of the State in criminal cases. Nor have the
courts allowed this independently of statute.58 It is crystal clear,
however, that there is today no constitutional objection to the ad-
missibility of depositions by the State (assuming the defendant had
an opportunity to cross-examine) and that material witness statutes
can no longer be justified on the theory that the witness' presence in
court is essential to satisfy the defendant's constitutional rights.
There is, furthermore, no compelling reason for not allowing the
prosecutor, as well as the accused, to take the witness' deposition59
for use at trial where there is good reason to believe that his testi-
mony would otherwise be lost. And this should include the situation
56 ABA-ALI CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 56-58 (1930). "One of the evils in con-
nection with the administration of the criminal law in most states is the
practice of confining for long periods of time, generally in the county
jail, witnesses who cannot give bail. The purpose of the above section is
to remedy this situation." Note, (Apr. 1928 Draft). See also FLA. STAT.
§§ 902.15 to .17 (1941).
57 Some cases upholding convictions based on depositions are: People v.
Hunley, 313 Mich. 688, 21 N.W.2d 923 (1946); State v. Kemp, 124 La. 85,
49 So. 987 (1909); People v. Day, 219 Cal. App. 562, 27 P.2d 909 (1933);
State v. La Due, 164 Minn. 499, 205 N.W. 451 (1925). But cf. Haynes v.
People, 128 Colo. 565, 265 P.2d 995 (1954) (where the prosecutor did not
lay sufficient foundation).
58 The rules relating to constitutionality and use of depositions at trial by
the prosecutor may be found in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1397-98,
1401-05 (1940); 5 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§
2038-40 (1957); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 259 (12th ed.
1955); 2 Id. §§ 470-78. For annotations see Annot., 90 A.L.R. 377 (1934)
and Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1241 (1940).
59 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1398 (1940).
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where the prosecutor has reason to suspect that the witness will flee
the jurisdiction or go into hiding. At the trial the deposition should
be admitted for consideration by the jury against the accused if his
constitutional rights were observed and the witness has actually fled
and is not within the jurisdiction, or the prosecutor in good faith is
unable to locate the witness, or is unable to have the witness re-
turned to the jurisdiction.
One problem remains, that of jailing the witness where the de-
fendant is unknown or not in custody. In this situation the deposi-
tion of the witness could not be used at the trial against the accused.
It is submitted, however, that justice does not require that an inno-
cent person be jailed as a witness where the accused is unknown or
still at large. The danger of lengthy commitment is far too great.
Ronald L. Sluyter, '62
